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THE "BERMUDA TRIANGLE?"
THE CERT POOL AND ITS INFLUENCE
OVER THE SUPREME COURT'S AGENDA
Barbara Palmer*
It has been called a "monopoly," a "swamp," a "Leviathan,"
and even "the Bermuda Triangle."' The culprit: the Supreme
Court's cert pool, the system of randomly assigning petitions for
review to a single clerk for a recommendation regarding acceptance or denial of a case. Former Supreme Court clerk and solicitor general, Kenneth Starr, recently lamented that Supreme
Court justices have abdicated their responsibility in screening
cases for review and have ceded too much power to their clerks;
cases worthy of the justices attention go into the cert pool, but
they never come out. According to Starr, the cert pool "is at war
with Justice Louis Brandeis' proud proclamation that the justices, unlike high government officials from the other branches,
do their own work." Moreover, the cert pool "squander[s] a
precious national resource-the time and energy of the justices
themselves." Others agree that the cert pool is a "very dangerous proposition." 2 In 1998, USA Today conducted a five month
study on the "effect and growing influence of law clerks," with
several stories devoted to the influence of the cert pool. 3 In ad* Assistant Professor, Washington Semester Program, American University. The
author wishes to thank John Jacob, Archivist, at the Justice Lewis F. Powell Archives,
Washington & Lee University School of Law, and Joe Kobylka, Southern Methodist
University. All sources from the Powell Archives used in this article are on file with the
author.
I. All quotes are taken from Kenneth W. Starr, Trivial Pursuits at the Supreme
Court, Wall Street Journal A17 (Oct. 6, 1993), and Kenneth W. Starr, Supreme Court
Needs a Management Revolt, Wall Street Journal A23 (Oct. 13, 1993).
2. Roger K. Lowe, Most Supreme Court Justices Let Clerks Screen New Cases, Columbus Dispatch 9A (Oct. 1, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Columbia Dispatch File.
3. Tony Mauro, The Hidden Power Behind the Supreme Court Justices Give Pivotal Role to Novice Lawyers, USA Today IA (Mar. 13, 1998); Tony Mauro, Justices,
Court-Watchers Concerned with Clerks' Clout, USA Today 13A (Mar. 13, 1998); Tony
Mauro, Tactics, Law Clerks Influence High Court's Agenfk, USA Today lOA (Dec. 23,
1998); Tony Mauro, Steering Clear of Controversy Court's Inaction Allows Confusion,
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dition, at least one Justice has been publicly critical of this practice, Justice Stevens. 4 All of this has created a perception of the
justices shirking their duties and clerks determining access to the
nation's highest bench.
We actually know, however, very little about the role of the
cert pool and the potential influence of clerks. 5 Until now, there
have been no systematic assessments of the role of the cert pool
in determining the Court's agenda. With data from the 19711974 and 1984-1985 Terms, this analysis focuses on two criticisms
of the cert pool: (1) the cert pool largely determines case selection; and (2) the cert pool fosters the creation of a "cert-pool
voting bloc" among the Justices in the pool. Surprisingly, the
Court only took the action suggested by a cert-pool memo in approximately half the cases that were granted review. Moreover,
little evidence exists that the cert pool fostered the creation of a
voting bloc that controlled the Court's docket. In fact, votecohesion between the justices in the cert pool actually declined
over time. In very few cases, the cert-pool justices voted as a
USA Today 1A (Dec. 23, 1998).
4. Mauro, The Hidden Power Behind the Supreme Court Justices Give Pivotal Role
to Novice Lawyers (cited in note 3). Interestingly, Stevens is currently the only Justice
who is not a member of the cert pool.
5. The general influence of clerks over the Supreme Court's inner-workings has
long been a controversial topic in the popular press and news media. See David J. Garrow, The Lowest Form of Animal Life?: Supreme Court Clerks and Supreme Court History, 84 Cornell L. Rev 855 (1999). Two of the more "notorious" accounts of clerk control over the Court are Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong's The Brethren (Simon and
Schuster, 1979), and Edward Lazarus' Closed Chambers (Times Books, 1998). Most of
what we know about clerks comes from Justices' biographies or personal accounts of the
clerks themselves. Sec Dean Acheson, Recollections of Service With the Federal Supreme
Court, 18 Alabama Lawyer 355 (1957); Paul R. Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 Vand. L. Rev. 1125 (1973); Alexander M. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of
Mr. Justice Brandeis: The Supreme Court at Work (Belknap Press, 1957); Sidney Fine,
Frank Murphy: The Washington Years (U. of Michigan Press, 1996); John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994); Alpheus Thomas Mason,
Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (Viking Press, 1956); Chester A. Newland, Personal
Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 Or. L. Rev. 299 (1961); Richard
A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform (Harvard U. Press, 1985); J. Harvie
Wilkinson, III, Serving Justice: A Supreme Court Clerk's View (Charterhouse, 1974);
Samuel Williston, Life and Law: An Autobiography (Little, Brown and Co., 1940). What
little academic research that exists on clerks provides a very different picture than the
media, suggesting that the influence of clerks is often overstated. See Saul Brenner and
Jan Palmer, The Law Clerks' Recommendations and Chief Justice Vinson's Vote on Certiorari, 18 Am. Pol. Q. 68 (1990); Kevin T. McGuire, Advocacy in the U.S. Supreme
Court: Expertise Within the Appellate Bar, 11 Canst. Comm. 267 (1994); Karen O'Connor
and John R. Hermann, The Clerk Connection: Appearances Before the Supreme Court By
Former Law Clerks, 78 Judicature 247 (1995); H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide:
Agenda Seuing in the United States Supreme Court (Harvard U. Press, 1991); Saul Brenner, Error-Correction on the U.S. Supreme Court: A View from the Clerks' Memos, 34
Soc. Sci. J. 1 (1997).
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bloc against the non-cert pool justices. At best, evidence for the
influence of the cert pool over the Court's agenda is quite limited. Cert-pool memos primarily serve as summaries for the justices, not as a screen.
I. THE CREATION OF THE CERT POOL
The cert pool was implemented in October of 1972, but
there is very little historical record of its creation. Justice Powell
is usually credited with the idea of streamlining the process of
case selection, 6 but Chief Justice Warren Burger also claimed
that the cert pool was his idea. 7 Unfortunately, archival documentation sheds little light on the development of the cert pool.
In fact, if Powell was the primary force behind the cert pool, his
personal papers are decidedly lacking in any kind of written records or memoranda regarding its creation. 8
Although the genesis of the cert pool is unclear, the logic
behind its creation is clear: to save time and increase efficiency.
During the 1960's, the Court's docket had grown rapidly, reaching over 4000 cases by the early 1970s, and the process of disposing of cases was unique to each Justice's chamber. With the cert
pool, rather than each chamber reviewing every petition that
carne to the Court, petitions would be randomly assigned in
equal numbers to each chamber that participated in the pool. A
clerk would then evaluate the petition and write a "cert-pool
memo," ranging from two to twenty pages long. The memo had
a standard format, beginning with a statement of the issues
raised, followed by summaries of the facts of the case, the lower
court opinion, and the contentions and arguments presented by
the parties. At the end of the memo, the clerk would discuss
6. See, e.g., Jeffries, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. at 270-72 (cited in note 5); Oifford
M. Kuhn and George E. Butler, III, "An Opportunity to be Heard": An Oral Interview
with Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 1 Ga. J. of Southern Legal Hist. 413 (1991); William H.
Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How it Was, How it Is (William Morrow, 1987); Bernard
Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court (Oxford U. Press, 1993).
7. Kuhn and Butler, 1 Ga. J. of Southern Legal Hist. at 430 (cited in note 6).
8. The first written memo regarding the cert pool is dated June 7, 1973. It was an
assessment of the performance of the cert pool during its first year of operation and a
discussion of whether it should be continued over the summer. See Supreme Court B
Memoranda- General, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. Beginning in the
fall of 1973, Powell included a section on the cert pool in the manuals he created for his
clerks. See Supreme Court- Memoranda- Clerks B Procedures Book #1, 1973-75, and
Procedures Book #2, 1975-82, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. Other than
this, Powell's papers contain no documents regarding the actual creation of the cert pool,
debate over how it was to be run, or any discussion of the format and content of cert-pool
memos.
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reasons why the cert petition should or should not be granted.
This memo would be circulated to all the chambers in the pool.
Upon receiving the pool memo, another clerk would "mark up"
the memo for his or her specific justice, providing further analysis or disagreeing with the pool memo's assessment.
Unlike decisions on the merits and the circulation of opinion drafts, the Justices rarely debate the decision to grant review
to a case. 9 The time pressures created by the docket simply prohibit meaningful discussion of all but a few noteworthy cases.
Given this, clerks in the cert pool could conceivably have a great
deal of influence over the Court's agenda. With Justices spending so little time reviewing each petition, those in the pool would
almost have to rely on cert-pool recommendations. The Justices
in the pool share an important source of information that the
non-cert pool justices lack, the cert-pool memo. As a result, the
Justices in the pool would probably tend to vote together, creating a "cert pool voting bloc." Thus, it does seem logical to expect that the clerks in the cert-pool would largely determine
which cases were selected.
II. LOOKING AT CERT POOL MEMOS
Empirically assessing the influence of the cert pool poses
some significant challenges. Agreement between Justices' votes
and clerk recommendations "does not prove that the justice[s]
[are] being influenced; the law clerks might be merely following
the guidelines established" by the Court; in other words, the(o
might be using the same criteria that the Justices are using. 0
The Justices have specified particular criteria for screening cases,
conflict among the circuits being one of the most important, 11
and clerks in the cert pool obviously look for cases with these
characteristics. On the other hand, some correlation between
Justices' votes and pool-memo recommendations must be shown
as a precondition of any inferences regarding influence. If there
is little to no association between pool-memo recommendations,
the Justices' choices, and the Court's docket, the cert pool is not
influencing case selection.
The most substantial problem posed by any kind of study of
the cert pool is the availability of data. Currently, Justice Lewis
9. See Perry, Deciding to Decide (cited in note 5); Robert L.Stem, et al., 7 Supreme Court Practice (Bureau of National Affairs, 1993).
10. Brenner and Palmer, 18 Am. Pol. Q. at 68 (cited in note 5).
II. Stern, et al., Supreme Court Practice (cited in note 9).
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Powell's papers are the only public source of cert-pool memos.
While Justice Powell did keep pool memos from cases the Court
decided during his tenure, unfortunately he destroyed all his records on cases that were denied review. Consequently, it is impossible to assess how many times the Court voted to deny review when the cert-pool memo recommended that a case should
be granted. It is also impossible to assess how many times the
Court agreed when the cert-pool memo recommended that a
case should be denied review. On the other hand, the vast majority of cases that come to the Court are "frivolous," particularly those filed in forma pauperis by prisoners. It stands to reason that, in i.f.p. cases in particular, the clerks and the justices
would be in agreement regarding the denial of review, not because the clerks are exerting "influence" over the Justices in the
cert pool, but because these are indeed cases that are not worthy
of the Court's time. 12 At any rate, while the lack of data from
cases denied review results in an incomplete picture of the influence of the cert pool, until we have better data, it is the best we
can do.
With these caveats, this analysis uses data from the certpool memos in the papers of Justice Lewis Powell from cases decided during the 1972-1974 Terms and the 1984-1985 Terms. 13
This allows us to assess possible changes that may have developed over time. It is conceivable that the influence of the cert
pool was relatively limited during the first years of its operation
given its novelty, but grew over time as the practice became institutionalized. During the 1972-1974 terms, the members of the
cert pool were Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and
Chief Justice Burger. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and
Marshall were not members. During the 1984-1985 terms, the
members of the cert pool were Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice O'Connor.
Justices Stevens, Marshall and Brennan were not members.
Data on justices' cert votes were collected from the papers
of Justice William Brennan from the 1971-1974 terms and the
1984-1985 terms. 14 With cert votes from before and after the
12. See Kuhn and Butler, 1 Ga. J. of Southern Legal Hist. at 430 (cited in note 6);
Perry, Deciding to Decide (cited in note 6).
13. Papers of Justice Lewis F. Powell, case folders from 1972-1974 and 1984-1985,
Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L.
14. Papers of Justice William J. Brennan, Part I, Boxes 417-26, 666-69,695-98, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Brennan's Papers are used for cert votes because
they are much more complete than Powell's.
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implementation of the cert pool in 1972, not only can we assess
the impact of the cert pool on the Court's agenda, but we can
also explore whether there were any changes in the voting behavior of individual Justices.
When cases arrive at the Court, justices and their clerks
have several options at their disposal in deciding what to do with
a particular case. The most obvious are granting or denying review to petitions for certiorari, or noting probable jurisdiction or
dismissing appeals. The Justices may also withhold a decision on
review until more information has been gathered. They may
"call for a response" (CFR), which allows the respondent (the
winning party below) to file a brief in opposition to certiorari, or
"call for the views of the solicitor general" (CVSG), in which the
Court invites the solicitor general to file an amicus brief, typically in cases that will potentially effect the federal government.
Cases can also be "held," pending a decision in another case, or
treated summarily and vacated and remanded without full plenary review. 15
15. Specifically, docket numbers were used as the unit of analysis to account for
consolidated cases. The data include cases that came to the Court through both certiorari and appellate jurisdiction; appeals cases were largely treated as discretionary and
were placed in the cert pool along with petitions for certiorari.
Cert-pool memos were coded as follows:
Grant the petition or note probable jurisdiction: The pool memo specifically
states that the case should be granted or noted. This includes pool memos with
language such as, "The Court should probably grant," or "This case is probably
cert worthy." This also includes pool-memo recommendations that review be
limited to specific questions within the petition or appeal.
Imply grant or note: The pool memo provides reasons why the case should be
granted or noted, but does not make a clear recommendation.
Deny the petition or dismiss the appeal: The pool memo specifically states that
the case should be denied or the appeal should be dismissed. This includes pool
memos with language such as, "The Court should probably deny", or "This case
is probably not cert worthy."
Imply deny or dismiss: The pool memo provides reasons for why the case should
be denied or dismissed, but does not make a clear recommendation.
No recommendation: The pool memo gives reasons why the case should be
granted/noted and reasons why the case should be denied/dismissed, or the discussion section of the memo focuses on substantive issues raised by the case. In
other words, there is no clear indication of any particular recommendation by
the cert-pool memo. This includes memos with language such as, "This is a
tough case", or "This is a close case."
Take some other action: The pool memo suggests holding for another case, vacating and remanding, affirming or postponing the appeal, calling for the views
of the solicitor general (CVSG), or calling for a response from the respondents
or appellees (CFR).
Justices' votes were coded as follows: Grant the petition or note probable jurisdiction
(including instances when the Justices granted review limited to specific questions), Deny
the petition or dismiss the appeal, Take some other action (including holding for another
case, vacating and remanding, affirming or postponing the appeal, calling for the views of
the solicitor general- CVSG). Another option used by Justices is a "join 3" vote. There
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III. THE CERT POOL'S INFLUENCE OVER THE
COURT'S AGENDA
How often did the Court actually do what the pool memo
recommended? Table 1 shows the cert-pool recommendations
from all cases granted review during the 1972-1974 and 19841985 Terms. In the early years of the cert pool, the decision to
grant review was largely left open by the clerks. During the
1972-1974 period, the clerks specifically recommended that the
Court grant review to the cert petition or appeal in only 24% of
the cases that were granted review.
Table 1
Action Recommended by Cert Pool Memos in Cases
that were Granted Review
1972-1974
Grant the petition or note
probable jurisdiction

1984-1985

24% (73)

51% (151)

Imply grant or note

9% (29)

0

Deny the petition or dismiss
the appeal

5% (15)

24% (71)

3% (9)

0

47% (144)

.5% (1)

13% (40)

25% (73)

= 310

N=296

Imply deny or dismiss
No recommendation
Take some other action*

N

* includes recommendations to hold for another case, call for the views of the
solicitor general (CVSG) or call for a response from the respondent (CFR), or
treat the case summarily.

were no join 3 votes during the 1971-74 period, but by the 1984-85 period, they were relatively common. Join 3 votes were coded as votes to grant review.
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In other words, the cert-pool memo suggested that the Court
grant review in only one-fourth of the cases that made it onto the
Court's agenda.
In another 9% of cases, the cert-pool memo did not specifically state that the case should be granted review; but the recommendation was implied. 16 These were cases in which the pool
memo indicated that the criteria for granting review were present in a particular case, but did not specifically state that a case
should be granted review.
In 15 cases, or 5%, the pool memo recommended that the
case be denied, but the Court granted review; and in another
3%, the pool memo implied that there were no reasons to grant
the case, but the Court did anyway. Thus, 8% of the time, the
Court did the opposite of what the cert pool recommended.
During the first three years of the pool, by far the most
common recommendation made by a cert-pool memo was no
recommendation at all. In 47% of the cases that were granted
review during the 1972-1974 terms, the clerk writing the memo
did not take a specific position regarding whether the Court
should grant review. In fact, it was quite common for the clerk
to give reasons why the case should be granted, but also reasons
why it should not be granted. 17 In almost half of all cases, the
clerk discussed pros and cons regarding whether the case should
be granted, specifically leaving the judgment up to the Justices.
This suggests that cert-pool memos served primarily as summaries for the Justices, rather than an initial screening method.
Cert-pool memos provided a more efficient means of getting
16. Kokoszka v. Belford provides a good example of this: the discussion section of
the pool memo states that "there appears to be a direct and clear conflict .... The issue
would seem to have importance for the many wage earner bankrupts in this country."
Preliminary Memo, pp. 3-4, Kokoszka v. Belford, File Number 73-5265, Powell Archives,
Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L.
17. A typical example is Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., et al.: the final
discussion section of the pool memo explains that "[i]n general, only the tolling issue appears to be worthy of review, and since that issue cannot be readily separated form the
remaining issues in the case, perhaps this is not a good case to grant. The seeming importance of the issue and the incipient conflict are strong countervailing factors, however."
Preliminary Memo, p. 16, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., et al., File Number
73-1543, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. Another example is Williams and
Williams Co. v. United States: the pool memo explains that "[t]his is obviously an important case in terms of the impact upon the medical and scientific publishing industry and
the effective operation of research libraries ... [but J this is a close case, and because it is
the first case from the Court of Claims under this statute, the Court may want to forego
consideration for further developments in the field." Preliminary Memo, p. 13, Williams
and Williams Co. v. United States, File Number73-1279, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee
U. Sch. of L.
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through the docket for the Justices in the pool by condensing
case records. At least in the early years of the cert pool, the Justices were clearly making the ultimate decision to grant or deny
review in the vast majority of cases and were still very much in
control of their agenda. 18
In fact, it was not until the 1981 Term, almost ten years after
the pool's creation, that clerks began consistently recommending
a specific course of action in the "discussion" section at the end
of the memo. 19 In the beginning of the 1983 term, a change occurred in the format of pool memos, with the addition of a final
section entitled "Recommendation." 20 This section was typically
only one to three sentences and provided a specific statement
regarding what the Justices should do with the case. As Table 1
shows, during the 1984 and 1985 terms, only one cert-pool memo
out of almost 300 did not make a specific recommendation regarding a particular case. 21
With cert-pool memos now making specific recommendations in every case, we would expect that the cert pool would
have substantially more influence over the Court's agenda. It
seems logical to expect that if the Justices now required the clerk
writing the cert-pool memo to make a specific recommendation,
they would follow it, at least most of the time. The addition of a
short "Recommendation" section to the end of the pool memo
suggests that, along with summary information, the Justices
wanted to know what the cert-pool clerk thought should be done
with the case.
At Table 1 shows, the Court took the pool memo's suggestion to grant cases about twice as often as it did in the early years
18. The influence of cert-pool memos when they fell into the "take some other action" category is probably minimal. When a cert-pool memo recommended CFR or
CVSG, and the Court agreed, it appears that it was up to clerks in the Justices' individual
chambers to take further action. According to Powell's manuals for his clerks, if the
Court did, in fact, CFR or CVSG after it was recommended in a cert-pool memo, it was
standard procedure for his clerks to write a brief update for Powell. Powell Memoranda
to Clerks- Orientation, 1974-75, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. Thus, if a
recommendation regarding review was made, it did not come from the cert pool. In addition, the number of instances in which a cert-pool memo recommended that the case be
disposed summarily were extremely low, only 1.5% of cases granted review during the
1972-74 period and 2% during the 1984-85 period.
19. This was determined by searching case files in Powell's papers until consistent
recommendations were found. There was a relatively clear break in the frequency of
recommendations between the 1980 and 1981 terms.
20. There are no memos in Powell's papers describing what brought about this formal change.
21. Preliminary Memo, Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc, eta/., File Number
83-2129, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L.
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of its operation, but this is at least partly due to the increased
number of recommendations in the cert-pool memos. On the
other hand, it is quite remarkable that during the 1984-1985
Terms, the pool memo recommended that a case be granted review in only half of the cases that were actually granted review.
Even more strikingly, the cert pool had recommended that the
Court deny review in 24% of the cases granted. Thus, in almost
one-fourth of the cases that were granted review, the Court ignored the recommendation of the cert-pool memo. This is also a
substantial increase over the earlier period.
With the Court accepting half of the cases that the cert-pool
memo recommended, the cert pool may have played a much larger role in the development of the Court's agenda by the 1984-85
terms. On the other hand, the high number of cases in which the
Court rejected the cert-pool recommendation indicates that even
when clerks suggested a specific course of action, the Justices
still made their own independent judgments regarding case selection. Even in this later period, it appears that cert-pool
memos were still serving primarily as summaries and not a
screening-method.
IV. THE CERT POOL'S INFLUENCE OVER THE
CERT-POOL JUSTICES
If the Court did what the cert-pool memo recommended
about half the time, was it, in fact, the Justices in the cert pool
who voted to accept these cases, or was it some combination of
Justices in and out of the pool? If the Justices in the pool were
voting together in these cases, this would suggest that the pool
fostered a voting bloc that was able to determine half of the
Court's docket. The influence of the cert pool on the Court's
agenda would be more indirect, but still important.
Table 2 shows how many times Justices in the cert pool
voted together in various-sized voting blocs before the implementation of the cert pool and for the two periods after the implementation of the cert pool.
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Table 2
Voting Blocs on the Court
post-pool
1972-1974

post-pool
1984-1985

32% (43)
74% (99)
100%(135)

41% (103)
71% (178)
99% (251)

15% (36)
35% (86)
64% (157)
95% (235)

(N = 135)

(N = 254)

(N = 248)

48% (123)
86% (220)
100%(258)

40% (104)
83% (215)
100%(259)

48% (132)
94% (258)

(N = 258)

(N = 259)

(N = 274)

pre-pool
1971-1972
Number of Justices
in the cert pool who
voted as a bloc:
6
At least 5
At least 4
At least 3

Number of Justices not
in the cert pool who
voted as a bloc:
4
At least 3
At least 2

Prior to the creation of the cert pool, during the 1971-1972
terms, Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and Chief
Justice Burger, the five Justices who eventually made up the cert
pool, voted together as a bloc of five 32% of the time. Once the
cert pool was implemented, they voted as a bloc of five 41% of
the time, an increase of 9%. This does suggest that the cert pool
contributed to the development of a cert-pool voting bloc. Further analysis, however, suggests a much murkier picture. Only
four Justices' votes are needed to grant review, so a more accurate picture of the influence of the cert pool on the Court's
agenda is drawn by considering whether the cert pool fostered a
bloc of four Justices among the five in the cert pool. In other
words, how often did at least four of the five justices in the cert
pool vote together and ensure that a case was granted? As Table 2 shows, there was virtually no difference between the 1971-
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1972 and the 1972-1974 periods in the number of cases that at
least four cert-pool justices voted together. If anything, there
was a slight decline, from 74% to 71%.
What is quite clear, however, is that by the 1984-1985 period, ten years later, vote cohesion among pool justices had substantially declined. Admittedly, the addition of one more Justice, O'Connor, increasing the pool to six, simply makes it harder
for them to vote as a bloc. On the other hand, the other five Justices who were in the pool from 1972-1974 were still there in
1984-1985. They voted as a bloc of six in only 15% of the cases
granted review. They voted as a bloc of four or more only 64%
of the time, a measurable decrease from the earlier periods, particularly the pre-cert pool years. It should also be noted that by
the 1984-85 period, in 5% of the cases granted review, no more
than two Justices could agree on a chosen course of action; there
were at least three different voting blocs among the Justices in
the cert pool.
Although vote cohesion among the Justices in the cert pool
declined over time, were these Justices still more cohesive than
the Justices who were not in the pool? Given that the number of
non-cert-pool Justices has always been smaller than the number
of cert-pool Justices, comparisons between the two groups are
not precise, but the data are noteworthy. Table 2 indicates that
the vote cohesion among the four Justices who were not in the
pool, Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, declined
from 48% to 40% during the 1971-1972 to 1972-1974 periods.
They did vote as a bloc of three, however, well over 80% of the
time during both periods. Without a cert pool, these Justices'
votes were still relatively cohesive. During the 1984-1985 period,
the three remaining non-cert pool Justices voted together as a
bloc only half the time, in 48% of the cases granted review, suggesting that the decline in vote cohesion over this ten year period was a Court-wide phenomenon.
In the years immediately after the implementation of the
cert pool, there was virtually no change in the vote cohesion of
the Justices who joined the pool. Moreover, by the mid 1980s,
when cert-pool memos were making explicit recommendations
regarding which cases should be granted review, vote cohesion
among the Justices in the pool declined. The Justices who were
not in the cert pool also showed a relatively high level of vote
cohesion that declined over time. All of this suggests that factors
other than the cert pool were influencing the Justices' votes regarding certiorari.
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The data in Table 2 are important in that they provide a
comparison of the cert-pool Justices' cohesiveness before and after the implementation of the cert pool and a comparison to the
non-cert pool justices. But these data reflect the number of
times Justices voted in blocs, and thus potentially overstates the
influence of the cert pool. These data do not specify how often
the cert-pool justices voted in blocs as the cert pool recommended these justices should vote, a rather key assumption in assessing the actual influence of the cert pool over the Court's
agenda. Justices could be voting together as a bloc, but against
the cert-pool recommendation.
Table 3 shows the number of Justices in the cert pool who
voted as the cert-pool memo recommended. 22
Table 3
Voting Blocs Matching Cert-Pool Memo Recommendations
1972-1974*

1984-1985**

Number of Justices in the cert pool
who voted as a bloc as the cert
pool recommended:
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

41% (32)
17% (13)
11% (9)
9% (7)
1% (1)
22% (17)
(N = 79)

18% (38)
19% (40)
18% (37)
14% (30)
14% (30)
6% (13)
10%(20)
(N = 208)

*This column includes only those cases in which the cert pool memo recommended grant or note, deny or dismiss, and at least 4 pool justices participated.
**This column includes only those cases in which the cert pool memo recommended grant or note, deny or dismiss, and at least 5 pool justices participated.

22. This data includes only the cases in which the clerk writing the memo made a
clear recommendation to grant or note, deny or dismiss, which explains the small number
for the 1972-1974 period. Cases in which the cert-pool memo recommended some other
action are also excluded.
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During the 1972-1974 period, in 41% of the cases in which the
pool memo made a recommendation, all five Justices in the pool
voted accordingly. In an additional 17%, four of the cert-pool
Justices voted as the cert pool recommended. If these two categories are added, at least four of the Justices in the cert pool
agreed with the cert pool recommendation 58% of the time. But
it is important to keep in mind that during this early period, the
data include only half of the cases granted review, given the high
number of cases in which the cert-pool memo made no recommendation. Thus, during the early years of the cert pool, the
cert-pool Justices voted cohesively as the cert-pool memo recommended in only one-fourth of the cases that made it onto the
Court's docket. What is even more surprising is that 22% of the
time, or about just as often, the Justices in the cert pool unanimously rejected the cert-pool recommendation.
During the 1984-1985 period, the Justices in the pool voted
as a bloc of four or more in support of the cert-pool recommendation 55% of the time, essentially the same rate as the earlier
period. Thus, even when the pool memo was more likely to
make a recommendation, the Justices were not any more likely
to follow it. The Justices were much less likely, however, to
unanimously reject the cert-pool recommendation; they voted as
a bloc of six against the cert-pool memo only 10% of the time.
None of this, however, accounts for the votes of the noncert pool Justices. If the non-cert pool Justices are voting with
the pool Justices in these cases, then something other than the
pool-memo is catching the justices' attention. Unanimous cases
are a prime example. During the 1972-1974 period, 22% of the
time (17 cases) the Court unanimously agreed with the pool
memo recommendation to grant review. During the 1984-1985
period, 8% of the time (16 cases) the Court unanimously agreed
with the pool memo to grant review. These are cases that more
than likely would have been granted review even without a certpool recommendation. Once these are accounted for, the potential influence of the cert pool declines even more.
In addition, the cert-pool Justices rarely voted as a bloc
against the non-cert-pool Justices. During the 1972-1974 period,
there was only one case in which the cert-pool memo recommended a grant, the cert-pool Justices agreed and voted as a bloc
of four to grant, and the non-cert-pool justices voted as a unani-
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mous bloc to deny. 23 There were no cases in which all five certpool Justices voted against all four non-cert-pool Justices. During the 1984-1985 period, there were 29 cases in which the certpool memo recommended a grant, the cert-pool justices agreed
and voted as a bloc of four or more to grant, and the non-certpool justices voted as a unanimous bloc to deny. This is a substantial increase from the earlier period, but is still only 19% of
the cases in which the cert-pool memo recommended a grant.
As a proportion of all cases ultimately granted review by the
Court, this is a mere 10%. Thus, only in a few cases did a certpool voting bloc thwart the wishes of the non-cert pool Justices.
In the vast majority of cases, Justices in the cert pool and out of
the cert pool were voting together to determine which cases
were selected. Once again, this suggests that the influence of the
cert pool over the Court's agenda is mitigated by the independent judgments of the Justices themselves. Whatever influence
the cert pool may have over the Court's agenda is more than
likely attributable to the fact that the Justices and the clerks are
using the same criteria to evaluate cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Much of the recent criticism of the cert pool surrounds the
current status of the Court, with eight of the nine Justices participating in the pool. Conceivably, the cert pool's influence has
become more pronounced since the mid-1980's with almost the
entire Court in the pool. Unfortunately, cert-pool memos and
reliable cert votes from the 1990's are not publicly available/ 4
but the data from earlier periods are suggestive. Eliminating the
cases in which the cert-pool memo did not make a recommendation, the rate at which the Court agreed with the cert pool
slightly declined from 57% during the 1972-1974 Terms to 51%
during the 1984-1985 Terms. If the cert pool now has more influence, it means that this trend has been reversed. Vote cohesion between the Justices also substantially declined from the
early years of the cert pool to the 1984-1985 terms, and the cert
pool probably has become even less cohesive in the 1990s.
When the cert pool was created, those in the pool were largely

23. Preliminary Memo, Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Co., File Number 72822, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. Cert pool votes from Docket Sheet
72-822, Box 421. Papers of Justice Brennan, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
24. Currently, there are no pool memos publicly available from the period after
Powell left the Court in 1986.
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from the same ideological wing of the Court. All four of Nixon's
appointees joined the pool, along with Justice White. Even during the 1984-1985 terms, with the addition of Justice O'Connor,
there was still a relatively clear ideological break between those
in the pool and those out of the pool. Today, there is less ideological cohesion between the Justices in the pool, with the addition of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer.
At any rate, the simple fact that the Court disagreed with
the pool memo in almost half of the cases that were granted review is quite astonishing. Moreover, after the cert pool was implemented, vote cohesion between the Justices in the pool declined. Little evidence exists of a cohesive cert-pool voting bloc,
or more specifically, of a cert-pool voting bloc controlling a significant amount of the Court's agenda. If any cert-pool voting
bloc existed, Justices who were not in the cert pool usually voted
with the Justices in the cert pool, which substantially weakens
the possible influence of the cert pool. Moreover, the cert pool
did not have a clear or consistent impact on the voting behavior
of individual Justices. In general, their agreement rates declined
over time as well. Thus, it appears that the cert pool serves primarily as a time-saver and not an initial case-screener; it merely
provides the Justices with summarized versions of case records.
To a surprisingly large extent, the cert pool does not determine
which cases the Court ultimately decides. The decision to grant
review is still based on the independent judgments of the Justices.

